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In Korematsu v. United States,1 the Supreme Court upheld Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s 1942 order, approved by Congress, removing Japanese 
Americans from the West Coast to prison camps to prevent possible 
sabotage and espionage.2  Even though it had become apparent by the time 
the case reached the Court that there was no credible evidence of such 
treachery, a majority of Justices refused to second-guess the political 
branches’ prudential judgment that this evacuation was necessary during the 
emergency that followed Pearl Harbor.3  Accordingly, the Court ruled that 
 
 *    James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law.  J.D., Yale, 1988. 
 1.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 2.  Id. at 215–24.  The President authorized the Secretary of War to exclude “any persons” from 
designated Pacific Coast “military areas” (i.e., those deemed especially susceptible to attack, such as 
defense installations and port cities) and to provide for their transportation, food, and shelter.  See 
PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 63 (1983) (citing Executive Order No. 9066).  Although the order 
did not explicitly say so, it was well understood that the targeted “persons” were Americans of 
Japanese descent and that they would be interned.  See id. at 38–103. 
 3.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218–19, 223–24. 
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the government’s paramount interest in national security justified the serious 
infringement of the detainees’ constitutional rights to liberty and equality.4 
Erwin Chemerinsky argues that Korematsu was a “terrible” decision, 
based on three criteria.5  First, it had a devastating human and social impact 
on Japanese Americans.6  Second, the majority opinion exhibited shoddy 
judicial craftsmanship by failing to recognize that the relocation and 
internment program did not meet the demanding legal test of strict scrutiny 
that applies to racial discrimination.7  Third, Korematsu had a negative 
doctrinal effect, especially by reinforcing the idea that constitutional rights 
can be disregarded in times of crisis.8 
Dean Chemerinsky’s selection of Korematsu as one of the worst 
decisions ever reflects the consensus of constitutional law scholars.9  Indeed, 
I have previously commented that the Court sustained “seemingly blatant 
constitutional violations” that appeared to be “monstrously unlawful”10 and 
that “FDR’s internment of Japanese Americans is a stain on his legacy, an 
overreaction to Pearl Harbor that reflected racism more than military 
exigencies.”11  Alas, I have now been asked to play devil’s advocate by 
defending Korematsu.12  I can hardly do so by praising the Court’s abstract 
legal analysis or moral wisdom.  Instead, I will try to explain why 
Korematsu and similar decisions have been rendered throughout American 
history. 
My account grapples with a critical question that Dean Chemerinsky 
largely avoids: If Korematsu strikes us as clearly wrong, why did the Court 
fail to grasp this obvious point?  The answer cannot be that Hugo Black and 
the five Justices who joined his opinion (including William Douglas) did not 
care about individual rights and liberties, for these liberal Democrats almost 
 
 4.  Id. at 223–24. 
 5.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy Hopefully Never to Be 
Repeated, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 163, 164 (2011). 
 6.  Id. at 166–67. 
 7.  Id. at 168–69. 
 8.  Id. at 169–70. 
 9.  See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 
WIS. L. REV. 273, 273, 296 (noting this widespread agreement). 
 10.  Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The 
Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1009, 1014 (2007) 
[hereinafter Pushaw, Enemy Combatant]. 
 11.  Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justifying Wartime Limits on Civil Rights and Liberties, 12 CHAP. L. 
REV. 675, 686 (2009) [hereinafter Pushaw, Justifying]. 
 12.  A few other scholars have tackled this difficult task.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 294, 299 (2003) (approving Korematsu on the pragmatic ground 
that the Court properly declined to use hindsight in evaluating the government’s action, but rather 
recognized that federal officials had erred on the side of caution in uncertain circumstances); see 
also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 289–307 (contending that the Court, in cases like Korematsu, should 
candidly acknowledge that executive officials will exercise extra-constitutional powers during 
emergencies and therefore should leave such judgments to the political process, instead of 
rationalizing such measures as constitutionally valid). 
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always sought to expand constitutional rights and vigorously protect them.  
Rather, the Court reacted the way it always has in a major war: by deferring 
to a strong and popular President who, with Congress’s support, had taken 
an action that he deemed militarily necessary, despite infringements of 
constitutional rights.13  Such results are commonplace because the 
Constitution assigns war powers exclusively to the elected branches and 
creates a Judiciary with limited competence to review their military 
decisions.14  Only by ignoring the Constitution’s institutional framework and 
its historical implementation can Dean Chemerinsky assert that the Court 
must uphold individual rights equally in times of war and peace. 
The foregoing themes will be developed in two parts.  Part I will 
critically examine Chemerinksy’s proposed factors for assessing Supreme 
Court decisions, which improperly suggest that the Justices should creatively 
construe the Constitution on a case-by-case basis to achieve liberal social 
results.  Part II will explain Korematsu in light of the Constitution’s political 
and institutional arrangements, which throughout history have typically led 
the Court to yield to the President and Congress during wartime. 
I.  WHAT MAKES A SUPREME COURT DECISION BAD OR GOOD? 
Dean Chemerinsky sets forth three assessment criteria.  First, the 
Justices should have the empathy to understand the human and social impact 
of their decisions.15  These effects can be horrible, as cases like Dred Scott v. 
Sandford16 and Plessy v. Ferguson17 illustrate.18  Second, Chemerinsky 
considers the quality of judicial craftsmanship: “Is the opinion well-
reasoned?  Is precedent accurately cited?  Does the opinion adequately 
address opposing views?”19  He offers as examples of poor craftsmanship 
Bush v. Gore20 and Griswold v. Connecticut21—although he clarifies that the 
problem with Griswold was finding a right to privacy in the “penumbras” of 
the Bill of Rights, instead of holding that “liberty” in the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause includes “a fundamental right of 
 
 13.  I have elaborated this thesis in Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1009–47. 
 14.  See id. at 1005–23. 
 15.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 168–69. 
 16.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 17.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 18.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 165–66. 
 19.  Id. at 165. 
 20.  531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 21.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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individuals to choose whether to procreate or not.”22  Third, Chemerinsky 
analyzes the impact of a case on the later development of legal doctrine.23  
For instance, Lochner v. New York24 had a pernicious influence because it 
led federal courts for three decades to strike down state laws protecting 
employees and consumers.25 
Dean Chemerinsky asserts that “there could be widespread agreement 
that these are appropriate criteria to use in evaluating Supreme Court 
decisions.”26  Perhaps, but I think his proffered factors give short shrift to the 
Constitution as law and instead focus on the Court developing doctrines that 
implement liberal social ideas.  Because the Justices swear to uphold the 
Constitution, our supreme and fundamental law, the key question should be 
whether they have done so. 
Therefore, I would judge the Court’s opinions based on a two-step 
“Neo-Federalist” analysis.27  First, the Justices should try to determine, in 
light of the Constitution’s structure and underlying political theory, a 
disputed clause’s original “meaning” (its ordinary definition in 1787), 
“intent” (its drafters’ purposes), and “understanding” (the sense of its 
ratifiers and earlier implementers).28  Second, the Court should then preserve 
those originalist principles that remain relevant, albeit filtered through two 
centuries of practice and precedent, by developing workable legal rules that 
can be applied as impartially and consistently as possible.29 
I recognize, of course, that each of these steps requires the exercise of 
judicial discretion.  First, the historical materials do not always disclose clear 
answers.30  However, sometimes they do, and more often they at least 
 
 22.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 165. 
 23.  Id. at 166. 
 24.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 25.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 166. 
 26.  Id. at 164. 
 27.  For a detailed description and defense of this methodology, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 
397–99, 454, 470–72 (1996) [hereinafter Pushaw, Justiciability]. 
 28.  I have long drawn subtle distinctions among original “meaning,” “intent,” and 
“understanding.”  See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any “Dear 
John” Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 478 n.35 (1998) 
(citing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 7–11 (1996)). 
 29.  See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: 
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control 
Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1999) (employing this methodology to devise and apply 
rules to determine whether or not Congress has exceeded its power “to regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States”). 
 30.  See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural 
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 740–54, 782–85, 799–867 (2001) (acknowledging that neither 
Article III nor the records of the Convention and Ratification debates directly mention inherent 
judicial authority, but identifying legal principles to govern such powers based upon constitutional 
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narrow the range of plausible interpretations.  Second, the Court would have 
to make delicate judgments as to which elements of the original meaning, 
intent, and understanding are worth maintaining and how they can best be 
promoted.  Despite these difficulties, Justices should strive to articulate and 
apply rules that are rooted in the Constitution’s text and history, not simply 
rely on their prudential wisdom to reach results that strike them as politically 
or socially correct.31 
Dean Chemerinsky would reject my rules-based approach as misguided.  
Indeed, he has long maintained that the Court should construe the 
Constitution by exercising discretion, informed by the Justices’ sense of 
morality, to give specific meaning to the Constitution’s abstract language—
an indeterminate and evolutionary process that strives to identify and 
preserve society’s fundamental values.32  But why should five Justices’ 
personal opinions about morality and basic social values trump the People’s 
collective wisdom about such matters embodied in the Constitution—or the 
policy preferences of elected representatives that do not run afoul of any 
constitutional provision as “the People” understood it?33 
The acid test to determine if a judge or scholar has a legally principled 
constitutional approach is whether its application sometimes leads to results 
that conflict with that individual’s politics or ideology.  For instance, Akhil 
Amar, a liberal Democrat, has employed a Neo-Federalist methodology34 to 
arrive at conclusions that appeal to conservative Republicans like me in 
areas such as abortion and constitutional criminal procedure.35  Conversely, I 
have often interpreted the Constitution’s text, structure, history, and 
precedent to reach results that I find politically distasteful.36 
 
structure and theory, early congressional practice, and precedent from the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries). 
 31.  I have developed this idea in a symposium essay.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of 
Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1185–87, 
1206–11 (2003). 
 32.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 45–141 (1987). 
 33.  To be clear, I agree with Dean Chemerinsky that “the Supreme Court has tremendous 
discretion” and that it is embarrassing when nominees like John Roberts and Sonia Sotomayor deny 
this fact.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 163.  Unlike Chemerinsky, however, I do not think that such 
vast prudential power is good, and hence I would try to cabin it by insisting that the Court make a 
good faith effort to determine the actual law of the Constitution, grounded in its text and history. 
 34.  See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985). 
 35.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and 
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 68, 75–79, 81–82, 109–14 (2000). 
 36.  For instance, I have criticized the restrictive interpretation of Article III, championed by self-
professed judicial conservatives like Justices Frankfurter and Scalia, as inconsistent with Article III’s 
language, its history, the structural principle of separation of powers, and pre-New Deal precedent.  
See, e.g., Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 27, at 395–99, 454–512; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article 
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To take one example, I attacked Bush v. Gore37 on two grounds.  First, 
the case should have been dismissed as nonjusticiable because the 
Constitution commits resolution of presidential election disputes to the 
political process (initially to state officials, then to Congress to ascertain the 
validity of the electoral votes).38  Second, contrary to the majority’s holding, 
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause’s language, history, or precedent 
prohibits inconsistencies within states in counting votes.39  Consequently, I 
agree with Dean Chemerinsky that “Bush v. Gore is . . . a poorly reasoned 
judicial opinion.”40  But so is Baker v. Carr,41 in which the Court incorrectly 
reached the political questions presented and invented a new Equal 
Protection requirement: that state legislative apportionments must be based 
solely on population.42  Legal consistency would dictate that Chemerinsky 
condemn both Bush and Baker, but he has applauded the latter decision.43  
The most logical explanation is that Bush produced a conservative result, 
whereas Baker reached a liberal one. 
Interpretation of the Due Process Clause provides another illustration of 
the advantages of apolitical Neo-Federalism over Dean Chemerinsky’s 
approach.  The Constitution’s text, political theory, and history all indicate 
that the government cannot deprive a person of “liberty” (i.e., physical 
freedom) without “due process of law”—a fair hearing before an impartial 
decisionmaker.44  Accordingly, I have criticized the Court’s manipulation of 
the concept of “liberty” to achieve political and ideological goals, regardless 
of whether they are conservative (such as the “freedom of contract” rationale 
of cases like Lochner) or liberal (such as the right to abortion fabricated in 
Roe v. Wade).45 
By contrast, Dean Chemerinsky condemns Lochner yet praises the 
Court for creating a “fundamental right” to make choices about 
 
III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 447, 465–532 (1994); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power Over Federal Court 
Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847. 
 37.  531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 38.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative Mirror, 
18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 359–60, 390–94 (2001) [hereinafter Pushaw, Conservative Mirror]. 
 39.  See id. at 394; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the 
Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and 
Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603, 619–23 (2001). 
 40.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 165. 
 41.  369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 42.  Id. at 209–37. 
 43.  See Pushaw, Conservative Mirror, supra note 38, at 379–81 (describing this politicized 
approach taken by Chemerinsky and other scholars). 
 44.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 663–64, 718 (1988) 
(discussing these traditional procedural mechanisms to safeguard “liberty”). 
 45.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional Common 
Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 519 (2008). 
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procreation.46  But if he believes that the Justices can craft constitutional 
rights to implement their personal notions of morality and their social 
values, both Lochner and Roe must be equally valid.  Indeed, Chemerinsky 
would have to accept as legitimate the overruling of Roe and Casey47 by a 
majority of Justices, based on their traditional moral and social convictions.  
Adopting Chemerinsky’s criteria, the Court could conclude that Roe was a 
bad decision because it displayed sloppy judicial craftsmanship, had a 
devastating human and social impact by allowing over forty million 
abortions, and had negative doctrinal effects by extending its dubious 
privacy rationale to areas like sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas.48  Indeed, 
Justice Scalia has made such arguments.49 
Chemerinsky would likely respond that Roe correctly recognized a 
fundamental right to make reproductive choices, that its doctrinal impact in 
cases like Lawrence has been positive, and that its social effect has been 
beneficial by enhancing women’s personal autonomy and economic 
opportunities.  But there is no objective way to determine whether this moral 
and social vision, or Justice Scalia’s, is correct.  That is why Scalia would 
leave abortion to the political process, despite his deeply held pro-life 
views.50 
Put simply, conceptions of morality and the social good are subjective 
and contested, which makes it troubling when the Court adopts one set of 
beliefs and imposes it on the nation under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation.  That is exactly what the Court did in cases like Roe, Dred 
Scott v. Sandford,51 and Plessy v. Ferguson.52 
 
 46.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 166. 
 47.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), two 
Justices voted to reaffirm Roe in its entirety.  See id. at 911–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 922–43 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter issued a “joint opinion” preserving Roe’s central holding that 
women had a right to abortion before fetal viability, but giving states more latitude to regulate 
abortion.  See id. at 834–901. 
 48.  539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling recent precedent and holding that the right to privacy 
includes the freedom of consenting adults to engage in sodomy). 
 49.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst 
Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003) (condemning Casey). 
 50.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 979–81, 994–96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 51.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney rejected the 
dissenters’ moderate and humane constitutional approach, and instead adopted the most extreme 
proslavery position: that the Constitution did not include blacks (even free ones) as “persons” or 
“citizens,” that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories, and that any attempt to do so 
would deprive emigrating slave owners of their property without due process.  See AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 98, 253–54, 264–65, 380–82, 405 (2005) 
(summarizing and criticizing Dred Scott on these grounds). 
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In short, I reject the notion that the Justices should interpret the 
Constitution by exercising virtually unrestrained discretion to identify and 
protect what they feel are fundamental social values, based on their moral 
sensibilities.  Rather, the Court should apply a Neo-Federalist methodology 
to constitutional provisions, which would in most instances yield rules of 
law that can be applied fairly and consistently.53 
In rare situations, however, a careful study of the Constitution’s 
language, structure, history, and precedent leads to the conclusion that a 
particular issue cannot readily be resolved through principled legal 
decisionmaking.  The best example is the federal government’s exercise of 
its constitutional war powers in a manner that allegedly violates individual 
rights.  The Court has always struggled in such cases because (1) it is not 
well-equipped institutionally to review the political branches’ determination 
that a specific act was necessary to ensure military success; and (2) 
invalidating such an action could lead to a loss of American lives and limbs 
(or even the war itself).54  Therefore, I disagree with Dean Chemerinsky that 
we can readily compare wartime decisions like Korematsu with those that 
exclusively involved domestic affairs such as Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, 
Griswold, Roe, and Bush.  I aim to show that his suggested criteria, which 
are of limited utility even in the latter cases, provide almost no help in 
evaluating the Court’s opinions concerning military actions. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING KOREMATSU: POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL LIMITS ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY DECISIONS 
Dean Chemerinsky applies his three criteria to Korematsu and gleans 
several lessons.  I will begin by summarizing the inadequacies of his 
approach to Korematsu.  I will then provide a more complex account of 
constitutional adjudication during wartime, which will help us comprehend 
why the Court decided Korematsu the way it did. 
A.  A Critical Analysis of Chemerinsky’s Three Factors 
First, Dean Chemerinsky details the negative human and social impact 
of the majority’s holding on the lives of 110,000 Japanese Americans, who 
were deprived of their liberty and property because of their race.55  I do not 
wish to minimize their hardship by observing that World War II claimed 
 
 52.  163 U.S. 537 (1896).  Contrary to the majority’s vision of segregation as the appropriate 
social and moral order, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited states from precisely 
the sort of racial discrimination that Louisiana had practiced by separating black and white 
passengers on trains.  Id. at 552–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 53.  See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 54.  See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1017–47. 
 55.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 166–67. 
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over sixty million lives56 and that hundreds of millions of people 
experienced injury, starvation, and massive property destruction.57  Most 
importantly to the United States, our armed forces incurred over 400,000 
deaths and many more wounded.58  As these statistics remind us, the Justices 
living through the war had a very different perspective on the human and 
social impact of their decisions than we do today.  That is why this proposed 
criterion is not very illuminating in assessing Korematsu or any other 
wartime case. 
Second, Dean Chemerinsky stresses the poor judicial craftsmanship of 
Justice Black’s opinion: The Court properly created the strict scrutiny test 
and found national security to be a compelling government interest, but 
incorrectly held that the summary imprisonment of Japanese Americans was 
a necessary (or even reasonable) means to achieve that interest.59  Rather, the 
Court should have required the federal government to perform “individual 
screening” to determine whether any people of Japanese descent posed an 
actual threat.60  From this failure to do so, Chemerinsky draws the lessons 
that detention should only be based on individualized suspicion of a crime 
and that Americans should always keep in mind that their governments have 
engaged in race discrimination.61 
These conclusions are generally sound as to garden-variety Due Process 
and Equal Protection cases, but they may not hold true in the extraordinary 
conditions of wartime.  Most pertinently, in Korematsu the Court ruled that, 
on the record presented, it lacked a factual basis to dispute the federal 
government’s judgment that the post-Pearl Harbor emergency did not allow 
time for investigation of each Japanese American and that mass evacuation 
was necessary to prevent any acts of espionage or sabotage (as even one 
might have crippled the war effort).62  As we shall see, these same 
problems—the Judiciary’s relative lack of competence and information vis-
 
 56.  See GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II 
894 (1994).  This total includes Nazi Germany’s systematic murder of six million Jews.  Dean 
Chemerinsky compares this Holocaust to the internment of Japanese Americans.  Chemerinsky, 
supra note 5, at 166–67.  I do not think that imprisoning 110,000 people can meaningfully be 
equated with killing six million.  But perhaps this difference simply illustrates my point that 
judgments about human and social impact are inherently subjective. 
 57.  See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF 
JAPANESE AMERICANS 5 (2001) (deploring the mistreatment of Americans of Japanese descent, but 
acknowledging that these “human costs . . . were insignificant compared with the military casualties 
of World War II”). 
 58.  See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 141 (2010). 
 59.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 166. 
 60.  Id. at 168. 
 61.  Id. at 169–71. 
 62.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944). 
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à-vis the Executive, and its fear that second-guessing the government might 
lead to disaster—arise in every case reviewing military actions.63 
Such institutional dynamics are built into the Constitution.  Thus, 
although the United States has formally apologized for Korematsu64 and 
both the Bush and Obama Administrations have been careful after 
September 11 to avoid a repeat (i.e., targeting all persons of Saudi Arabian 
and Egyptian descent merely because those were the nationalities of the 
terrorists),65 such a scenario cannot be dismissed as unthinkable.  For 
example, imagine if al Qaeda had immediately followed its 9/11 attacks by 
killing half of Chicago’s residents with biological weapons, and the 
government then received reliable intelligence of a forthcoming nuclear 
assault on a major West Coast city.  In that situation, the President would 
probably take drastic action (which might include discrimination based on 
ethnicity), and in a legal challenge the Court could hardly be expected to 
mechanically apply its usual rules of individualized suspicion for common 
crimes and strict scrutiny of racial classifications. 
Third, Dean Chemerinsky argues that Korematsu and other war powers 
cases have had a destructive doctrinal effect: “In times of crisis, especially 
foreign-based crisis, we compromise our most basic constitutional rights 
only to realize in hindsight that we were not made any safer.”66  The lesson 
he derives from this phenomenon is that the Court should not abdicate its 
responsibility to enforce constitutional rights during military emergencies.67 
In reality, however, no single war powers decision has much lasting 
doctrinal influence because each case is sui generis, and Korematsu is hardly 
a robust precedent.68  Furthermore, although Chemerinsky has the luxury of 
 
 63.  See infra notes 71–83 and accompanying text. 
 64.  See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2006) (apologizing and paying 
reparations to those who had been imprisoned). 
 65.  See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272, Titles I & X (Oct. 26, 2001) 
(codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.) (prohibiting 
discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans and providing for review of all claims of civil 
rights abuses). 
 66.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 169. 
 67.  See id. at 169–70; cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors 
Epstein and Wells, 69 MO. L. REV. 959 (2004) (arguing that federal courts usually yield to the 
President in wartime primarily because of political and institutional factors that are embedded in the 
Constitution’s structure, not because the judges psychologically share the President’s “skewed risk 
assessment” whereby threats to national security are overestimated and liberty interests are 
undervalued). 
 68.  Chemerinsky concedes that the Court has never relied upon Korematsu in its Equal 
Protection rulings.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 171.  His suggestion that the case has 
nonetheless contributed to a culture of needlessly sacrificing constitutional rights during 
emergencies is debatable.  If anything, Korematsu has had the opposite effect.  For instance, in 
waging the War on Terrorism, President Bush and Congress took great pains to prevent “another 
Korematsu.”  See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.  Despite their efforts, the Court has 
bent over backwards to thwart any perceived curtailments of the federal constitutional and statutory 
rights of detained enemy combatants.  See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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hindsight, Presidents in the thick of war do not, and the Court has never 
judged them on that basis.69  Moreover, sometimes presidential decisions 
that curtailed constitutional liberties most likely did make the United States 
safer—although such conclusions are inevitably speculative: 
[I]t is impossible to say with any certainty whether or not Presidents 
like Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt had to infringe 
constitutional liberties the way they did in order to win their wars.  
Perhaps they could have achieved the same results with fewer 
intrusions.  But maybe greater solicitude for personal freedoms 
would have led to defeat, or to a victory that exacted a far greater 
cost in blood and money.  Speculating about such matters is an 
academic exercise.  All we know for sure is that these Presidents 
took the actions they deemed necessary to prevail, and they did.  
For better or worse, the Constitution commits to the President 
almost unbridled discretion to determine what must be done to meet 
a military emergency.  These decisions must be made quickly and 
with imperfect information, and they are then judged by Congress, 
voters, and posterity.  All of these groups tend to be quite forgiving 
of the President if he triumphs.70 
Finally, and most importantly, the Constitution’s text, structure, history, and 
implementing practice and precedent all refute Dean Chemerinsky’s 
argument that the Court should apply the same standard of review in times 
of war and peace. 
B.  Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims in War Powers Cases 
The Constitution contemplates that only the political branches have the 
democratic legitimacy, institutional competence, and political incentives to 
formulate and implement military and foreign policy.71  Article I authorizes 
Congress to provide for the national defense; declare war; and create, fund, 
 
 69.  See Pushaw, Justifying, supra note 11, at 696 (making this point, and acknowledging that 
“with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that certain Presidential actions went beyond the pale,” 
such as “Roosevelt’s mass internment of Japanese Americans”). 
 70.  See id. at 675–76 (footnotes omitted); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 608–10, 612–22 (2003) (setting forth and 
criticizing the prevalent libertarian view that presidents routinely curb civil rights and liberties to a 
far greater extent than is necessary to ensure military victory). 
 71.  See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1017–23 (analyzing the pertinent 
constitutional provisions and historical sources). 
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and regulate the Army and Navy.72  Article II confers on the President “[t]he 
executive Power”73 (to implement Congress’s military measures) and makes 
him the “Commander in Chief” of the armed forces.74  Moreover, Article II 
presupposes that the President can unilaterally respond to emergencies 
because he alone possesses all executive power, is always on duty, and can 
take swift and decisive action based on the expert advice of his subordinates, 
who filter masses of information (often confidential).75 
In sum, the Constitution gives the political departments all war powers, 
as well as the weapons to check each other.76  By contrast, the Framers 
excluded the Judiciary from warmaking.77  Therefore, bare claims that a 
military act exceeded the powers of Congress under Article I, or the 
President under Article II, raise political rather than judicial questions.78 
However, judicial review might be proper when the exercise of war 
powers allegedly violates a plaintiff’s individual legal rights.  Unfortunately, 
the historical materials do not indicate whether such cases should be (1) 
dismissed as political questions; (2) treated the same as normal domestic 
 
 72.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11–16. 
 73.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 74.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 75.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 471–73, 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 
AMAR, supra note 51, at 132–33.  In contrast to the President, Congress and the courts work slowly 
and deliberatively in fixed sessions with frequent recesses.  See AMAR, supra note 51, at 131–204, 
351–63 (stressing such institutional differences in the Constitution’s scheme of separation of 
powers). 
 76.  For instance, Congress can investigate the President’s military actions, cut off funding for 
them, and impeach executive officials for egregious misconduct.  Pushaw, Justifying, supra note 11, 
at 679–80.  Conversely, the President can veto bills that do not promote his military vision, exercise 
discretion in executing laws pertaining to the armed forces, and use the unique advantages of the 
unitary Executive to get his way in times of war.  See id. (describing such checks). 
 77.  See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 27, at 507–08 (demonstrating that the Constitution’s 
framework of shared Legislative–Executive power over military affairs necessarily excluded the 
Judiciary); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding 
of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 176–82, 269–70, 284, 287–90, 295–96, 300 (1996) (showing 
that the Convention and Ratification debates contain no hint that federal judges could or would 
review the exercise of war powers by Congress or the President, who were given complete authority 
in this area and were expected to check each other). 
 78.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  
The Court has consistently reaffirmed this principle of nonjusticiability.  See, e.g., Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–71 (1803); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28–33 
(1827); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38–45 (1849); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 
Wall.) 243, 251–54 (1863); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 71–77 (1867); Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770, 774–87 (1950); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5–12 (1973); see 
also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the 
Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2002) (citing these cases and 
others in examining problems with the political question doctrine and proposing a solution based on 
historical understandings). 
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decisions; or (3) resolved through a compromise approach of exercising 
jurisdiction but showing great deference to the political branches.79 
Almost all liberal scholars share Dean Chemerinsky’s opinion that the 
Constitution requires the second approach—asserting judicial review 
vigorously at all times—and that therefore the Court’s contrary decisions 
like Korematsu are lamentable exceptions to this rule.80  This view, however, 
does not have a firm foundation in the Constitution, either as written or as 
applied. 
Rather, the Court has generally recognized war as unique and hence 
chosen the third option, which strikes me as a sensible way of balancing the 
Constitution’s authorization of judicial review to safeguard constitutional 
rights with its provisions entrusting our national defense to Congress and the 
President.81  The degree of deference shown to the elected branches has 
varied with the facts and circumstances, with three considerations emerging 
as especially salient.82  The first is the gravity and urgency of the military 
crisis, and the perceived necessity for the President’s responsive measures.  
The second is the egregiousness and magnitude of the resulting violation of 
individual rights.  The third is the likelihood that the Court’s orders will be 
obeyed, which depends upon the President’s political strength and popularity 
and also on whether the emergency is ongoing or has passed.  Of course, 
such political and pragmatic calculations are made sub silentio, but they tend 
to drive the decisions far more than the formal legal analysis set forth in the 
Court’s opinions.83 
Once one recognizes the inevitably political dimension of judicial 
review during wartime, a historical pattern emerges.  On the one hand, the 
Court always defers to strong Presidents in the midst of serious military 
conflicts when they take what they deem to be necessary steps, despite 
invasions of constitutional rights.  On the other hand, when a crisis has 
passed, if a President is politically weak yet continues to act aggressively, 
the Court reasserts itself by questioning the need for the President’s action 
 
 79.  See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1023. 
 80.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 171–72; see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 
10, at 1006–08 (citing like-minded academics).  Some liberals have challenged this orthodoxy.  See, 
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 66 (approving the Court’s 
approach of taking jurisdiction to protect individual rights yet exhibiting great respect for the 
military judgments of Congress and the President). 
 81.  See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1013–17, 1023. 
 82.  For detailed support for the analysis in this paragraph, see id. at 1013–16, 1046–47. 
 83.  Typically, these opinions discuss three questions.  First, did Article II or a federal statute 
authorize the President to take the challenged action?  Second, if so, did he nonetheless violate 
individual constitutional rights?  Third, if there was such an infringement, was it necessary to protect 
national security? 
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and upholding individual rights.  This cycle can best be illustrated by 
examining the Civil War and World War II. 
1.  Lincoln and the Civil War Cases 
Lincoln argued that the President’s duty to preserve, protect, and defend 
the Constitution (and the Union it created) warranted the temporary sacrifice 
of individual constitutional provisions.84  Accordingly, he made many 
unilateral decisions that Dean Chemerinsky and others would decry as 
unconstitutional.85 
The three most famous actions implicated the Due Process Clause.  
First, even though that provision prohibits the government from summarily 
taking property, Lincoln responded to the attacks on Fort Sumter by 
blockading Confederate ports and seizing all offending ships (and their 
cargo).86  Second, he established and staffed military commissions instead of 
providing court access.87  Third, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus.88  His initial goal was to jail Confederate sympathizers in Maryland 
who were urging that slave state to secede, a move which would have 
crippled the war effort by cutting off Washington from the rest of the 
Union.89  Chief Justice Taney ordered the President to cease such 
detentions.90  Lincoln ignored Taney and justified his conduct in an address 
to Congress that stressed the President’s paramount duty to defend the 
Constitution by preserving the United States Government.91 
Congress backed the President and retroactively approved his actions.92  
The Court rolled over and upheld Lincoln’s seizure of ships in The Prize 
 
 84.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 691, 722 (2004) (book review). 
 85.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 169–70.  But see DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S 
CONSTITUTION 7–8, 15–25, 115–95 (2003) (cataloguing the measures Lincoln imposed that seemed 
inconsistent with many constitutional provisions, but generally defending their validity). 
 86.  See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–71 (1863) (sustaining the blockade and 
seizures as part of the President’s powers as Commander in Chief). 
 87.  See FARBER, supra note 85, at 8, 17, 19–20, 118, 144–45, 163–75. 
 88.  Id. at 16–17, 19, 117, 144, 157–63, 192–95. 
 89.  Id. at 16–19, 117, 144, 157–63; AMAR, supra note 51, at 122, 355. 
 90.  See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147–53 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (holding 
that Lincoln had usurped Congress’s exclusive Article I power to suspend habeas and the Judiciary’s 
Article III power to determine whether citizens had been detained in violation of their due process 
rights). 
 91.  He said: “‘[M]easures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming 
indispensable to the preservation of the . . . nation.’ . . .  ‘[A]re all the laws, but one [i.e., the Habeas 
Corpus Clause], to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?’”  
See Paulsen, supra note 84, at 721, 723 (quoting Lincoln). 
 92.  See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 
Stat. 755 (specifically authorizing Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus).  Although 
civil libertarians continue to portray Lincoln as a tyrant, many scholars have correctly emphasized 
that he respected our constitutional democracy and consistently sought Congress’s approval for his 
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Cases93 and his use of military commissions in Vallandigham94 on the 
ground that it could not review the President’s exercise of his discretion as 
Commander in Chief to make such decisions.95 
After the war had ended, Lincoln had been assassinated, and the 
politically weak Andrew Johnson had become President, both Congress96 
and the Court reasserted themselves.  In Ex parte Milligan,97 a majority of 
Justices invalidated a military commission on the ground that the habeas 
petitioner had a right to an ordinary jury trial.98  The Court declared: “The 
Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, 
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, 
and under all circumstances.”99  This grand statement conflicted with the 
Court’s candid confession that it had failed to live up to this ideal during the 
Civil War100 and with its later capitulation to Presidents during military 
crises, such as its approval of Woodrow Wilson’s effective suspension of 
freedom of expression during and after World War I.101 
Dean Chemerinsky does not mention this historical context.  Rather, he 
echoes Milligan’s empty rhetoric by asserting that “[t]he Court should not 
abdicate its responsibility to enforce the Constitution, even in wartime. . . .  
The Court has to be there to enforce the Constitution for all Americans at all 
times.”102  Similarly, he claims that Lincoln restricted constitutional rights 
and liberties without making the country any safer.103  But how does 
Chemerinsky know this?  It is impossible to determine what would have 
happened if Lincoln had not done what he did.  Perhaps the Union still 
would have won the Civil War.  But it is at least equally plausible to 
 
actions.  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 51, at 21, 38–39, 51–52, 118–19, 132, 146–47, 188, 196, 275, 
368–73, 471–72; FARBER, supra note 85, at 18, 24, 118, 137–48, 192–97. 
 93.  67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–82 (1863). 
 94.  Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 243, 252–54 (1864). 
 95.  See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670; Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 253–54. 
 96.  Controlled by Republicans (the same party as Lincoln), Congress pushed through legislation 
over the vetoes of the Democrat Johnson and eventually impeached him.  See MICHAEL LES 
BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 1–5, 89–95 (1973). 
 97.  71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 98.  Id. at 118–27. 
 99.  Id. at 120–21. 
 100.  Id. at 109. 
 101.  The Court went along with Wilson after he persuaded Congress to enact sweeping 
legislation instituting a draft, mobilizing domestic resources for the war effort, and curbing First 
Amendment rights to criticize the United States.  See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 94–96 (1976) (analyzing the relevant statutes and the Court’s 
decisions upholding them). 
 102.  Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 172. 
 103.  Id. at 169–70. 
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conclude that Lincoln’s forceful actions helped save our constitutional 
government, defeat the Confederacy, and end slavery.104  Why is 
Chemerinsky more concerned about the rights of Confederate sympathizers 
than with their hundreds of thousands of military victims, not to mention the 
plight of four million slaves? 
In short, the Court yielded to Lincoln—a strong and determined 
President who defied the Judiciary, yet enjoyed congressional support—
because it could not realistically overturn his discretionary judgments that 
his actions (even those that seemed to flagrantly violate the Constitution) 
were necessary to win a war for the very survival of our nation.  Once the 
emergency had passed, the Court took the offensive against a politically 
vulnerable President by upholding individual rights in the face of the 
Executive Branch’s invocation of military necessity.105 
The same pattern recurred in the mid-twentieth century.  The Court 
caved in to the popular Franklin Roosevelt when he infringed constitutional 
rights during the cataclysmic World War II, then reversed course in 1952 
against the politically weak Harry Truman at the tail end of the Korean War. 
2.  World War II and Korematsu 
Korematsu becomes intelligible if viewed through the lens of history.  
The Justices involved in the case were seasoned politicians.  Seven of them 
had been appointed by the immensely popular FDR, who shattered the 
tradition of two-term Presidents as he led America through the Depression 
and World War II.106  Furthermore, the Court understood the gravity of the 
emergency: Totalitarian regimes menaced not only the United States but all 
democracies.  Perhaps most significantly, the Justices did not naively believe 
that they could stop Roosevelt from taking actions he had determined were 
needed to win the war, even those that seemed to run afoul of the 
Constitution.107 
Indeed, as early as the mid-1930s, FDR had made it clear that he was 
willing to defy the Court, which initially attempted to thwart his New Deal 
 
 104.  See Pushaw, Justifying, supra note 11, at 677. 
 105.  Id. at 694. 
 106.  Roosevelt was elected four times with decisive majorities.  See United States Presidential 
Election Results, DAVID LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS (select “General by Year,” then follow the links to 1932, 1936, 
1940, and 1944) (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).  He appointed political professionals who were 
sympathetic to his policies, not experienced judges who might be more independent-minded.  See 
William P. Marshall, Constitutional Law as Political Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 525 (2005).  
The only non-FDR appointees left on the Court by 1944 were Chief Justice Stone and Justice 
Roberts.  See IRONS, supra note 2, at 228, 310, 313–14, 318–19. 
 107.  For example, the President seized over sixty plants where labor disputes and other 
difficulties had hindered the war effort.  See ROSSITER, supra note 101, at 59–63 (describing 
Roosevelt’s action and the Court’s wimpy response).  The Court delayed until the war’s end before 
entertaining Fifth Amendment challenges to those seizures, then dismissed the cases as moot.  Id. 
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programs as unconstitutional.108  In 1942, he again manifested that disdainful 
attitude after the Court in Ex parte Quirin109 agreed to hear the appeal of 
Nazi saboteurs (including an American citizen) who had been captured in 
New York.  They claimed that the imposition of the death penalty by a 
Roosevelt-appointed military commission had violated their due process 
right to an ordinary trial.110  The American public was outraged by the 
Court’s interference, and the President let the Justices know through back 
channels that he was going to execute the spies no matter what.111  The Court 
immediately folded.112 
In short, by 1944 it had become obvious that the Court was neither 
willing nor able to incur the wrath of Roosevelt by striking down his major 
war measures, however egregiously they might have invaded constitutional 
rights.  Hence, it is not surprising that the Court in Korematsu held that the 
government’s overriding interest in national security outweighed the 
infringement of Japanese Americans’ rights to liberty and equality:113 
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference 
to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses 
the issue.  Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area 
because of hostility to him or his race.  He was excluded because 
we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly 
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast 
and felt constrained to take proper security measures, [and] because 
they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded 
that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West 
 
 108.  Roosevelt reacted to these unfavorable cases by threatening to expand the Court’s size to 
fifteen and to appoint six new Justices who favored his positions.  See F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel 
P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 671–73 (2009) (outlining this 
Court-packing plan).  Similarly, in 1935, if the Court had invalidated FDR’s decision to take the 
United States off the gold standard, he was prepared to defy the Court and precipitate a 
constitutional crisis.  See William E. Leuchtenburg, Charles Evan Hughes: The Center Holds, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (2005).  Thus, the Justices realized that Roosevelt was unlikely to alter his 
war policies because of an adverse Court holding.  As his Attorney General remarked, FDR 
illustrated that “the Constitution has never greatly bothered any wartime President.”  See FRANCIS 
BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962); see also Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military 
Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 278 
(2002) (noting the popularity of, and respect commanded by, Roosevelt and Biddle). 
 109.  317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 110.  Id. at 22–48 (setting forth and rejecting this argument). 
 111.  See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 309, 
319–32. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–25 (1944). 
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Coast temporarily . . . .  [T]he need for action was great, and time 
was short.  We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm 
perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions 
were unjustified.114 
In other words, the Court recognized that Presidents in the heat of war must 
make swift decisions based on military and foreign policy intelligence that is 
constantly shifting, and thus judged Roosevelt’s conduct based on the facts 
available to him, not those that later emerged.115 
The attack on Pearl Harbor floored FDR and panicked the nation.116  
The President immediately investigated this disaster through various military 
and civilian advisers and committees.  Many of these experts (including his 
Secretary of the Navy and a commission headed by Justice Owen Roberts) 
concluded that the attack on Hawaii had been facilitated by Japanese spies 
and saboteurs living on the island, and that similar dangers lurked on the 
West Coast.117  Roosevelt understood that even one successful act of 
sabotage on a key target (such as a dam or bridge) could imperil the entire 
war effort.118  Furthermore, Western politicians, citizens, interest groups, and 
 
 114.  Id. at 223–24. 
 115.  See id. at 218–19, 223–24; see also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 70, at 608–10, 620, 
623–26 (arguing that we should evaluate the actions of government officials during crises based not 
on hindsight, but rather on the facts and circumstances that existed at the time those leaders made 
their decisions); Tushnet, supra note 9, at 287 (to similar effect). 
 116.  Many historians have exhaustively examined Roosevelt’s response to this emergency, which 
culminated in his order excluding Americans of Japanese descent from the Pacific Coast.  See, e.g., 
MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION 231–302, 
362–74 (1949); ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 72–124. 
 117.  Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox went to Hawaii to investigate and reached this 
conclusion.  See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF 
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 55–56 (The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund 1997) 
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE COMMISSION].  Similarly, Justice Roberts’s special commission found 
that Japanese nationals had committed espionage in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor, and Roberts had 
privately told FDR and Secretary of War Henry Stimson that Japanese Americans were 
untrustworthy.  See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 94–95; William H. Rehnquist, When the Laws 
Were Silent, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1998, at 76.  Roosevelt also created his own informal intelligence 
system through journalist John Franklin Carter and businessman Curtis Munson, and the cover letter 
summarizing their reports could have given the impression that Japanese Americans posed a great 
danger (assuming Roosevelt failed to read their full findings, which he often did).  See, e.g., 
ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 66–68; see also BIDDLE, supra note 108, at 187 (describing how 
Roosevelt would put his papers in a pile if they were too long or boring, to be removed by his 
secretary). 
 118.  In a letter to FDR, John Carter summarized five key points from a report by Curtis Munson.  
The fifth point stated: 
[D]ams, bridges, harbors, power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded everywhere.  The 
harbor at San Pedro could be razed by fire completely by four men with grenades and a 
little study in one night.  Dams could be blown and half of lower California might 
actually die of thirst.  One railway bridge at the exit from the mountains in some cases 
could tie up three or four main railroads. 
[Vol. 39: 173, 2011] Explaining Korematsu 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
191 
the media were clamoring for the removal of Japanese Americans.119  
Ultimately, Roosevelt chose this fateful course of action based on the 
recommendation of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who in turn had relied 
heavily upon General John DeWitt, the military commander on the West 
Coast.120  FDR thought that such military experts were in the best position to 
evaluate the threat,121 even though other executive officials disagreed with 
the evacuation.122 
Like all Presidents in wartime, Roosevelt had to act quickly by using his 
best judgment about how to achieve military success in light of the (often 
conflicting) advice of his subordinates.  He signed the exclusion order within 
hours of it being placed on his desk, and this subject was never discussed at 
a Cabinet meeting.123  FDR did not have much time to ponder the 
constitutional implications of this action because he was preoccupied with 
making critical strategic decisions in a truly global war (with Nazi Germany 
an especially formidable foe).124 
Roosevelt also knew that defeating America’s far-flung enemies would 
require massive manpower.  But America’s mothers and fathers (particularly 
 
ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 68 (quoting Memo, John Franklin Carter to FDR, Nov. 7, 1941, RG 
210, Box 573, NA, rpt. in CWRIC Papers, p. 3663 (reel 3, p. 638)).  Roosevelt sent the report to the 
Secretary of War, highlighting only this fifth point about the danger of sabotage.  See id. 
 119.  See GRODZINS, supra note 116, at 2–3, 19–179, 204–25, 253–59, 320–48, 361–65, 371–74; 
IRONS, supra note 2, at 38–47, 268–69; ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 87–93, 95–98. 
 120.  DeWitt urged the relocation of Japanese Americans as a military imperative.  See, e.g., 
BIDDLE, supra note 108, at 217–18; GRODZINS, supra note 116, at 40–41, 274–322, 337, 362–63, 
365–66, 370; IRONS, supra note 2, at 25–64, 364–65; ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 84–89, 96–97, 
101, 105–07.  Roosevelt generally deferred to the military on defense issues.  See BIDDLE, supra 
note 108, at 219; see also ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 110. 
 121.  See ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 110; see also IRONS, supra note 2, at 58, 363–65. 
 122.  For example, the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence believed that they had adequately 
identified members of the espionage network and that therefore the proposed mass removal was 
unnecessary.  See IRONS, supra note 2, at 21–23.  Similarly, Attorney General Biddle concluded that 
the military had failed to demonstrate the need for such an evacuation, and he attempted to convey 
his opinion to Roosevelt.  See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 114, at 78; see also 
ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 86–88, 92–94, 97–109 (describing Biddle’s opposition to internment). 
 123.  See GRODZINS, supra note 116, at 271–72. 
 124.  See ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 92.  Roosevelt left no record of his thoughts on the removal 
and detention of Japanese Americans, thereby forcing us to speculate about his state of mind.  See 
IRONS, supra note 2, at 354, 364–65.  We do know that FDR was focused on overall war planning 
and hence entrusted the internment decision—which he considered to be comparatively 
unimportant—to his military advisers, without consulting his Cabinet or requiring a thorough 
independent review.  Id. at 58, 363–65.  Moreover, unlike Lincoln, Roosevelt was neither an 
attorney nor a constitutional thinker.  Consequently, it seems likely that he either did not consider the 
constitutional ramifications of his order or simply assumed that the President could take any actions 
he deemed militarily necessary.  Id. at 364.  Overall, FDR appears to have been negligent, in both a 
human and legal sense, in failing to devote more attention to the plight of Americans of Japanese 
descent.  Id. at 57, 364. 
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in the West) would be reluctant to send their sons to fight overseas if they 
felt insecure at home.125  Such fears, whether well-founded or not, became 
part of FDR’s calculus.126  He apparently made the cold-blooded 
determination that Japanese Americans would have to endure 
disproportionate sacrifices to ensure the success of the overall war effort.127 
Of course, as Dean Chemerinsky stresses, many of Roosevelt’s trusted 
advisers (especially his West Coast military leaders)—not to mention 
politicians, journalists, and citizens—were motivated by raw racial 
prejudice.128  Especially shameful were FDR’s executive subordinates who 
manipulated intelligence data to wildly exaggerate the threat posed by 
Japanese Americans129 and Justice Department officials who withheld 
crucial information from the Judiciary in the Korematsu litigation.130  Here, 
however, I am focusing on the actions of Roosevelt himself and the Court 
that sustained his exclusion order, and I do not think that their behavior can 
be attributed to simple racism.131  Rather, FDR had to consider multiple 
factors under extreme time pressure,132 and the Court felt compelled to reach 
 
 125.  I thank Akhil Amar for bringing this point to my attention. 
 126.  Roosevelt’s internment decision was influenced in part by the widespread public 
apprehension, based largely on hysteria and racism, that Japan might invade the West Coast and 
receive assistance from Japanese-American spies and saboteurs.  See GRODZINS, supra note 116, at 
129–79, 204–25, 231–302, 361–65, 371–74; IRONS, supra note 2, at 26–28, 33–64, 362–65; 
ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 74, 81, 87–99, 101–02, 105–24. 
 127.  See ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 106–24 (analyzing the political, social, legal, moral, racial, 
and practical aspects of the evacuation decision and concluding that FDR acted more out of 
indifference to Japanese Americans than malice towards them). 
 128.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 168–69. 
 129.  See IRONS, supra note 2, at 25–64; ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 77, 84–87, 92, 94–99, 101, 
104–19, 122–24, 184–85, 209–10, 257. 
 130.  The Department of Justice deliberately suppressed evidence showing that the War 
Department’s reports of Japanese-American sabotage and espionage, which were critical to the 
government’s “military necessity” justification, had no factual basis.  See IRONS, supra note 2, at 
278–310; see also id. at 186, 202–18 (documenting similar unethical conduct in earlier related 
cases). 
 131.  See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 287–91 (emphasizing that the racial bigotry of certain 
subordinate executive officials, such as General DeWitt, cannot necessarily be attributed to the 
“higher ups” who ultimately made wartime decisions, most notably Roosevelt). 
 132.  To be clear, I am attempting to provide a rational explanation for Roosevelt’s initial decision 
to evacuate Japanese Americans in the chaotic aftermath of Pearl Harbor.  By contrast, I find totally 
inexcusable the President’s failure to free these detainees in early 1944 after his military advisers 
informed him that there was no longer any military necessity for the internment.  See IRONS, supra 
note 2, at 269–77, 365.  FDR delayed consideration of their liberation to gain a partisan advantage 
for Democratic candidates in the November 1944 elections, and only then began the process of 
closing the prison camps.  Id. 
  Moreover, this background helps us understand the relatively limited significance of 
Korematsu’s companion case, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).  Seeking a writ of habeas corpus, 
Endo argued that the federal War Relocation Authority (WRA) had violated her Fifth Amendment 
Due Process right to liberty by holding her without charges and without challenging her claim of 
loyalty to the United States.  Id. at 298–302.  The Court avoided this constitutional issue by ruling 
that Congress had failed to authorize detention of such patriotic Americans.  Id. at 297, 300–04.  
This statutory construction seems preposterous, as Congress had approved and funded precisely such 
undifferentiated imprisonment with FDR’s backing.  Nonetheless, this interpretive move exonerated 
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its result as a political and pragmatic matter.  As in the Civil War cases, a 
powerful President with broad congressional support had made a major 
decision in seeming violation of the Constitution because he had concluded 
that this drastic action was essential to win a high-stakes war, and he would 
likely defy any judicial decree to desist. 
Nonetheless, I believe that such political realities should not have led 
the Court to uphold on the merits a presidential measure that was of such 
dubious constitutionality, because doing so affirmatively legitimated 
Roosevelt’s conduct and tarnished the Court’s reputation.133  Rather, the 
Court should have dismissed the case on political question grounds by 
conceding that it could not meaningfully review the President’s exercise of 
his Article II power to take actions that he believed were militarily necessary 
based on the expert advice of his executive subordinates, who possessed 
extensive (and often secret) information.134  Admittedly, a dismissal 
predicated on justiciability would have been cowardly, but that result would 
have been preferable to what the Court actually did. 
Overall, at first glance, Korematsu seems to be an obviously awful 
decision.  However, deeper research into the situation facing Roosevelt in 
the early 1940s and the Court’s historical record in war powers cases helps 
to explain, if not justify, the Korematsu opinion. 
3.  The Cycle Continues: The Cold War and the War on Terrorism 
After FDR had died, the epic crisis of World War II had ended, and the 
unpopular Harry Truman had become President, the Court reasserted 
itself.135  Most famously, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,136 six 
 
Congress and the President of violating the constitutional rights of Japanese Americans by shifting 
responsibility to a small agency, the WRA.  See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1038–
39.  Furthermore, the Court postponed the release of its Endo judgment until the day after FDR 
announced he would end the internment.  Id. at 1039 n.148 and accompanying text. 
  In short, Endo involved only one petitioner, and future requests for habeas writs would be 
moot because the Japanese Americans were being freed.  Furthermore, neither Endo nor Korematsu 
held that these persons’ constitutional rights had been transgressed by Roosevelt.  Thus, the Court 
did not dare to challenge the constitutional validity of the President’s actions or order him to do 
anything against his will. 
 133.  I flesh out this position in Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1081–83. 
 134.  Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242–48 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (relying on 
this rationale to contend that the case should have been dismissed as nonjusticiable, but asserting that 
the Court, having exercised jurisdiction, should have invalidated the exclusion order because it 
violated the detainees’ constitutional rights).  I would confine my “political question” expedient to 
unusual and extreme situations such as that presented in Korematsu. 
 135.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 315–23 (1946) (interpreting an Act of 
Congress that imposed martial law in Hawaii as prohibiting the Executive Branch from using 
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Justices rejected Truman’s claim of Article II power to order the seizure and 
operation of domestic steel mills in response to a nationwide strike that 
jeopardized steel production critical to fighting the Korean War.137  Even 
though Lincoln and Roosevelt had successfully seized private property as 
part of their war efforts,138 the Court apparently concluded that (1) the 
Korean War was not that important and that Truman’s order was 
unnecessary; (2) taking property was an egregious Fifth Amendment 
violation; and (3) Truman lacked the congressional and popular support to 
resist the Court’s judgment.139 
During the next half century, however, the usual posture of judicial 
deference returned.140  Furthermore, I do not believe that the Court would 
have dared challenge George W. Bush in the immediate aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.  Rather, a majority of Justices waited until the 
emergency had passed, and Bush’s popularity had plunged,141 before 
proclaiming that his treatment of “enemy combatants” had needlessly 
violated important federal statutory and due process standards.142  Although 
constitutional law professors like Chemerinsky hailed these decisions as 
portending a new age of vigorous judicial enforcement of individual rights 
against Presidents during wartime, the lesson of history is that the Court will 
be unable to maintain this momentum if a popular President takes drastic 
action in a serious military crisis.143 
 
military commissions to try loyal citizens who had been charged with ordinary crimes that had no 
impact on national security). 
 136.  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 137.  See id. at 582–89; see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1042–44 
(examining Youngstown). 
 138.  See supra notes 86, 93, 107 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 10, at 1043–44 (supporting each of these points). 
 140.  See id. at 1044–45 (citing relevant cases). 
 141.  See Pushaw, Justifying, supra note 11, at 690–91, 695 (documenting Bush’s waning 
popularity at the time of each of the Court’s major decisions). 
 142.  The key cases, in chronological order, are: Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–85 (2004) 
(interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute as extending to petitions filed by alien detainees held 
in the United States-controlled prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, despite contrary precedent); Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509–39 (2004) (holding that indefinitely detained “enemy combatants” 
who were American citizens had a due process right to notice and a hearing before an impartial 
decisionmaker); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566–95 (2006) (creatively construing an Act of 
Congress that appeared to repeal the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay prisoners 
and to authorize the President to try them by military commissions as not intended to do these two 
things); and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (concluding, for the first time, that the 
Constitution’s privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked by noncitizen enemy 
combatants who have been captured and detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States).  With the exception of Hamdi, all of these cases contain dubious legal reasoning.  See Robert 
J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or 
Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 1999–2051 (2009) [hereinafter Pushaw, 
Creating] (providing an extensive critique of these decisions). 
 143.  See Pushaw, Creating, supra note 142, at 1976–81, 2046–50.  One of the lessons that Dean 
Chemerinsky draws from Korematsu is that detention should only be based on individualized 
suspicion of a crime.  He assails the Bush and Obama Administrations for imprisoning hundreds of 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
As our debate over Korematsu illustrates, Dean Chemerinsky and I have 
adopted quite different approaches to constitutional law.  He believes that 
the Court should use the Constitution instrumentally to identify and protect 
rights that embody liberal ideals of social and moral justice.  By contrast, I 
adhere to a “Neo-Federalist” methodology, which seeks to restrain the 
Justices’ discretion by requiring them to (1) formulate rules of law that are 
rooted in the Constitution’s language, structure, history, and early precedent; 
and (2) apply such rules without regard to whether they conform to the 
Justices’ ideology or politics.  I believe that a Neo-Federalist perspective 
would clarify and improve almost all areas of constitutional law. 
One notable exception is judicial review of the exercise of war powers.  
Although my textual and historical approach provides some valuable 
insights on this subject, I readily confess that it does not yield workable legal 
principles that can be applied consistently and apolitically.  Indeed, I have 
concluded that this problem is intractable because each military situation is 
unique and raises myriad legal, political, and pragmatic considerations that 
resist facile lawyerly categorization and analysis. 
It is against this backdrop that I have examined Dean Chemerinsky’s 
seemingly irrefutable argument that Korematsu is one of the worst decisions 
in American history.  My modest purpose has been to explain, not defend, 
Korematsu.  I have tried to show that this case follows a historical pattern in 
which the Court treats constitutional rights and liberties with far less respect 
during military crises. 
The Justices have always properly recognized that the Constitution 
commits all war powers to the political branches, which have a paramount 
duty to protect national security.  Even when the assertion of those powers 
allegedly violates individual rights, the Court has tended to defer to the 
President’s judgment that a particular action is militarily necessary, which 
rests upon the expert advice of his executive subordinates who have 
 
people in Guantanamo Bay without such probable cause and without affording them a meaningful 
due process hearing.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 171. 
  This criticism overlooks two important points.  First, although citizens who have committed 
ordinary crimes domestically enjoy the benefits of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, alien enemy 
combatants who have been captured and are being detained outside of the United States do not.  See 
Pushaw, Creating, supra note 142, at 2005–08, 2014–17, 2022–44.  Second, Congress has provided 
such detainees with comprehensive administrative and judicial review (including the right to appeal 
to the Supreme Court)—indeed, the most elaborate legal protections ever granted to military 
prisoners.  See id. at 2008–10, 2020–21, 2033, 2042.  Pursuant to these procedures, hundreds of 
these men have been released, and at least thirty of them have committed further acts of terrorism.  
Id. at 2044.  Their victims should be kept in mind as America determines how best to deal with 
suspected enemy combatants. 
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processed huge amounts of information.  Furthermore, the Court often has 
no realistic option but to yield to a strong President who enjoys popular and 
congressional support when he makes such decisions. 
Thus, Korematsu is not an aberration, but rather followed precedent set 
during the Civil War (such as The Prize Cases and Vallandigham) and 
World War I.144  My study of history convinces me that it is simply wishful 
thinking to hope that the Court will avoid similar decisions in the future. 
 
 
 144.  See supra notes 84–101 and accompanying text (discussing such decisions). 
